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IN .THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------
J, SEAL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ( 
vs. ) Case No. 11307 
LESLIE LeFEVRE, et al, ( 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
-----------------------------------
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE 
The Appellant, J. SEAL, having brought suit for 
breach of an express or implied contract for services rendered 
lby its Assignor, an attorney, appeals from an Order granting 
I 
Defendants• Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial Court granted Defendants 1 Motion for 
i 
lummary Judgment based on supporting Affidavits, following 
lppellant's filing of opposing Affidavits thereto and on the 
~sis of briefs submitted by both parties on the ground and 
uthe reason that "the proof ... negatives any" express 
rimplied promise for a contract of employment and there 
was therefore no material issue of fact. 
REUEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits the Summary Judgment of the trial 
:Curt should be reversed and the case remanded for a trial 
~ the merits • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Attorney Harold A. Ranquist, Appellant's Assignor, 
las retained in 19 64 by the holder of a permit on the Federal 
ange in Kanab Grazing District No. 11, managed by the 
ureau of Land Management, pursuant to the Taylor Grazing 
ct, to prosecute an appeal under the administrative pro-
tdure of the Federal Range Code. From an Order of the 
•nab District Manager of the Bureau of Land Management 
quiring, among' other things, that all cattle be removed 
ii 
from the Federal Range and placed on base property for two 
11) months. This issue was common to all of the livestock 
men in the district, including the Respondents (R. 27). 
The officer of the Kane County Cattlemen's Assoc., 
The Escalante Cattlemen's Assoc., and the Tropic Permittees 
met and agreed to retain the services of Appellant's Assignor 
and to bring the necessary action to resolve all of the dis-
putes between their members and the Kanab District Office 
of the B. L. M. (R. 28). 
These associations agreed to pay Appellant's Assign-
or for his services and to collect the same by sending to each 
llf their members a letter, asking them to participate in meet-
ings designed to discover the nature of their complaints. 
:(R. 53, 55 and 58). 
In addition, the members were to be contacted in 
!person and asked to pay an assessment of ten cents (10¢) per 
A, U. M., as their pro-rata share of the attorney's fees. 
(R, 28). 
Each of the Respondents were advised in several 
ii 
~r[tten communications of the existence of the problems and 
~they affected each permittee in the entire District. 
liter being invited to the meetings they were all advised that 
lliey would be assessed if they participated in the attempt to 
~solve the problems facing the livestock men of the District. 
~. 25) • 
Each of the Respondents then participated in the 
neetings in an attempt to communicate all of the facts in-
rolved in the dispute to the head of the U. S. Bureau of 
~nd Management. (R. 29). 
On December 16, 1964, Appellant's Assignor reached 
In agreement with the B. L. M., a copy of which was sent to 
~e Respondents (R. 66) that provided, among other things, 
~e important provision that 11 (t) he B. L. M. will not attempt 
10 enforce a program of making each permittee remove his 
ltvestock completely from the Federal Range for a two 
nonth, or one month period. 11 (R. 62 and 63). 
On December 21, 1964, all the Respondents were in-
!ormed that the major problem involving the use of the Range 
iii 
In the Kanab District had been solved and that they must 
each sign a Range Management Agreement to protect their 
A. U. M., at meetings to be held on December 29, 1964, 
and that if their assessment had not been paid they should 
come prepared to make arrangements for payments. (R. 58). 
In accordance with the understanding previously 
agreed to, one hundred sixty (160) livestock men in the 
district paid their pro-rata share to the respective cattle-
men's associations who remitted the sum to Plaintiff's 
lssignor, but the sixty (60)Res pondents herein refused to 
nake payment. (R. 29). 
Res pendent' s made a Motion for Summary Judgment 
witb supporting Affidavits from four (4) of the sixty (60) 
\espondents in which those four (4) stated that each knew"of 
lis own personal knowledge that none of the Defendant's 
!Ver had any contractual relationship, either verbal or 
vritten", with Plaintiff's Assignor "for the performance of 
1ny legal services." (R. 18, 22, 20 and 24). The Motion 
vas granted by the trial Court dismissing out of hand 
lppellant' s First Claim for breach of an express contract 
1v 
with nothing more than the comment that, "Plaintiff relies 
principally on the doctrine of Quantum Meruit" and dismiss-
ed his Second Cause of Action, pleaded in the alternative on 
the theory of implied contract, on the basis of Defendants' 
Affidavits for the reason that there was no proof of any con-
tract of employment either express or implied. (R. 96). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
i AN IMPLIED PROMISE ON THE PART OF THE 
hsPONDENT TO PAY THE SERVICES OF AN ATTORNEY ARISES 
~HERE HE KNOWINGLY ACCEPTS THE BENEFITS OF THE SER-
'1!CES, OR A SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IS PRESERVED, OR THE 
~ESPONDENT FAILS TO OBJECT OR PROTEST AND WHERE ALL 
1
THREE CON DITIONS EXIST IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO 
MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT. 
Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of an 
~ttorney's services rendered on his behalf, an implied prom-
lse to pay the value of his services arises. Bogorad v. 
~hwartz, C.A. 4 Md., 208 F.2d 704 (1953); and the cases 
Cited in 7 8 ALR 2d 318. 
-1-
While there is some conflict in the cases on this 
,point, they were reconciled in 78 ALR 2d. 322: 
"It should be pointed out that the knowledge 
mentioned is not merely knowledge that the services 
are being rendered, but know ledge that they are 
being rendered by the attorney on behalf of one who 
knows, or has reason to know, that the attorne 1 , ~ 
looking to him for payment. If this is kept in rninu 
in reading the cases, seemingly conflicts case will 
be harmonized to request intent." 
The Respondents in this case received a copy of an 
agreement setting forth the benefits they were to receive 
~R. 66) as a result of a successfully prosecuted appeal 
following their attendance at meetings designed to ascertain 
!their complaints against the B. L. M. Range policies (R. 29). 
Along with the copy of the agreement they received a request 
to pay for the legal services. (R. 67). Therefore, since the 
Respondents knowingly received the benefits following their 
active role in the prosecution of a successful appeal an im-
Plied contract arose for the payment of those legal services. 
In Burnett v. Graves, C. A. 5 Texas, 230 P. 2d 49 
(1956); 56 ALR 2d. 1, the Court held that when an implied 
Promise to pay the reasonable value of the services of an 
-2-
attorney arises, one factor of significance is the preserva-
•ion of a substantial interest. 
In the instant case, all of the Respondents were 
faced with the prospect of having to remove their cattle from 
the Federal Ranges for as much as two (2) months. Upon the 
successful resolution of the issues by Appellant's Assignor, 
they each received, among other benefits, an agreement 
,that "(t)he B. L. M., will not attempt to enforce a program 
!of making each permittee remove his livestock completely 
I . 
I 
!from the Federal Range for a two month, or one month period. " 
(R. 62 and 63). The benefits were substantial and according-
lyan implied promise to pay arose with respect to the pay-
ment of the attorney's fees. 
In Brown v. Friesleben Estate 184 Cal. App. 2 720, 
l07 P. 2d 388 (1957), the Court observed that when the 
Defendant h'as knowledge that an attorney is performing 
valuable services for him and fails to object, or dissent 
from such performance, an implied promise to pay the 
reasonable value of the services arises. 
-3-
Respondents were contacted by letter and in person 
and asked to pay a pro-rata share of the attorney's fees 
R, 28). Each of the Respondents was advised in several 
written communications of the existence of the problem and 
that if they participated in the attempt to resolve the prob-
Jem facing the livestock men of the District, they would be 
I 
assessed for the attorney's fees. (R. 29). 
After being informed of the proposed assessment they 
all attended meetings in an attempt to resolve the dispute 
I , 
'with the B. L. M. (R. 29). Further, after the successful 
settlement of the issue, they were again informed by mail 
of the then obligation to pay for the services and while 
one hundred sixty (160) of the cattlemen paid their assess-
ments, the Respondents refused to pay (R. 20). 
At no time did the Respondents object or dissent 
from the performance of the services which gave rise to the 
dispute herein and therefore an implied promise to pay for 
the reasonable value of the services arose. 
Since an implied promise to pay arises when only 
-4-
one of the three factors above mentioned are present, to-wit: 
1. knowing acceptance of the benefits of 
the services 
2. the preservation of a substantial interest 
3. the failure to object or protest 
,when all three factors are present, as here, a fortiori, an 
implied promise to pay the reasonable value of the services 
arises. 
POINT II. 
~·. RULE 5 6 (e} OF THE U. R. C. P. REQUIRES AN FIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 0 BE BASED ON SUCH FACTS AS WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE IN MDENCE AND RECEPTION OF FOUR OF RESPONDENTS' 
AFFIDAVITS CLAIMING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT NONE OF 
!HE OTHER FIFTY-SIX RESPONDENTS ENTERED INTO AN EX-
'PRESS OR IMPLIED AGREEMENT WITH APPELLANT'S ASSIGNOR 
IS HEARSAY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED THEREON IS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In McCormick on Evidence, Chap. 25 (1954), it is 
observed: 
"Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or 
written evidence of a statement made out of court, 
such statement being offered as an assertion to 
show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus 
resting for its value upon the credibility of the out 
of court assertor." 
The four (4) Affidavits in support of Respondents' 
-5-
--
I Motion for Summary Judgment set forth the following: 
i 
"The Affiant states that he knows of his own 
knowledge that~ of the defendants above named 
ever had any contractual relationship; either verbal 
or written .•.. for the performance of any legal 
services. • • " (R. 18, 20, 22 and 24) (Emphasis 
added.). 
If the four (4) Respondents' personal knowledge is 
based on what the other fifty-six Respondents told them it 
would be founded on the out of court assertions of each of 
them and as such, hearsay, and would not be in compliance 
with the requirements of Rule 56 (e), U. R. C. P., and the 
Affidavits were erroneously received. 
Further, since there were several meetings, all 
i Respondents being in attendance of at least one of them 
I 
(R. 29}, it stretches credibility to think that the four (4) 
Respondents were present at all meetings knowing positively 
. that during the same, none of the other fifty-six (5 6) Res-
pendents ever made an express or implied agreement. 
POINT III. 
A UNILATERAL CONTRACT IS ONE IN WHICH NO 
-o-
pROMISOR RECEIVES A PROMISE OR CONSIDERATION FOR HIS 
PROMISE AND WHEN FACTS ALLEGE ACCEPTANCE BY A 
SPECIFIC ACT APPELLANT HAS PLACED A MATERIAL FACT IN 
ISSUE AND IT IS ERROR FOR TRIAL COURT TO GRANT MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In Port Huron Machinery Co. v. Wohlers, 207 Iowa 
826, 221 N. W. 843 (1928), the Court observed with respect 
'to acceptance of a unilateral offer: 
"An offer may invite an acceptance to be 
made by merely an affirmative answer or by perform-
ing a specific act." 
The Restatement of Contracts, A. L. I.S 12, P. 10, sets 
forth the following: 
"A unilateral contract is one in which no 
promiser receives a promise or consideration for his 
promise .•• comment a. In a unilateral contract 
the exchange for the promise is something other 
than a promise. " 
In the instant case each of the Respondents were 
advised that if they attended and participated in meetings 
designed to resolve the problem facing the livestock men 
that they would be assessed a pro-rata share of the attorney's 
fee. Subsequently, each of the Respondents attended and 
participated in these meetings. (R. 29). 
-7-
The offer of the Appellant's Assignor was clearly 
communicated to the Respondents and the method of accept-
ance set forth in the form of an act: to-wit, the attendance 
and participation in meetings designed to resolve the prob-
terns of all the live stock men. The Respondents then 
,accepted by attendance and participation. Despite the 
trial Court's only comment as to Appellant's First Claim for 
relief that 11 (p)laintiff relies principally on the doctrine of 
Quantum Meruit, 11 (R. 9 6) the foregoing facts demonstrate 
that a unilateral contract was entered into by the parties 
herein and the Order granting Respondents' Motion for 
:Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
David A. Goodwill 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
330 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
-8-
